Under the Hood After the Bye: What the Texans Offense Should Build Around
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The Texans have an offense capable of making you believe in it and frustrating you within the same possession. The explosive gains are there. C.J. Stroud can move the ball through the air. Then a run goes nowhere, an opportunity to stay on schedule disappears, and another drive asks the passing game to rescue it.
Coming out of the bye, the useful question is how Houston can make its productive football show up more consistently. A look through the seven-game offensive sample points toward a passing game worth building around, a rushing attack that has too often worked against it, and some meaningful differences hiding inside the personnel and formation totals.
The numbers also challenge a few easy explanations. Two-tight-end personnel is struggling, but its passing and rushing results tell different stories. Singleback is inefficient overall, yet its passes have generated value. And second-and-short aggressiveness has produced better average results than a blanket criticism of those decisions would suggest.
That was my concern before digging into these splits. In an October 31 post, I described Houston as a boom-or-bust offense and questioned whether its approach was producing enough dependable first downs. The numbers are an opportunity to test that impression, including the parts that need more nuance.
Key Takeaways
The passing game is better than the overall offensive results suggest. Houston is above league average in passing EPA, with particular success attacking intermediate areas and several common zone coverages.
The rushing attack is undermining consistency. This is especially apparent when games are tied and in certain personnel groupings, where ineffective runs have repeatedly put the offense behind schedule.
Personnel usage deserves another look. The Texans have struggled running from 12 personnel and singleback, while Empty formations have produced encouraging results in limited opportunities.
The answer isn't necessarily less aggression. Houston's second-and-short passing has been productive. The goal should be more dependable ways to move the chains while preserving the passing game's strengths.
The production is ahead of the consistency
Across 452 plays, the Texans have generated +0.03 expected points added per play, slightly above the league’s +0.01 through eight weeks. Their 5.6 yards per play also beat the league’s 5.4, and their 14.2% explosive-play rate exceeds the NFL’s 12.9%. For this analysis, an explosive is a pass gaining at least 15 yards or a run gaining at least 10.
The success rate tells a less encouraging story: 43.4%, just below the league’s 43.7%. Here, success means the play generated positive EPA. Houston is producing more yardage and more explosives than the league average without producing positive-value plays more frequently.
That fits the boom-or-bust impression, and the drive results give it weight. Of 73 offensive drives with a matching play in the dataset, 26% ended in three-and-outs. Houston averaged 2.26 points per drive, scored touchdowns on 23.3% of drives, and punted on 39.7%.
Those numbers describe an offense that can generate valuable possessions while still giving away too many opportunities to establish a rhythm. They do not show that every failed possession follows the same pattern. Penalties, sacks, unsuccessful runs and missed throws all deserve attention when reviewing the actual sequences.
The clearest imbalance is between passing and rushing. Houston’s +0.14 EPA per dropback and 48.5% passing success rate both exceed the league’s +0.07 and 46.2%. Its rushing attack sits at −0.17 EPA per rush and 34% success, below the league’s −0.10 and 39.9%.
The run game’s problem extends beyond a shortage of long gains. Too many attempts fail to improve the offense’s position, leaving the more productive part of the attack with additional work to do.
The tied-score split deserves a hard look
Houston’s approach changes when the game is tied. Across 91 plays, the Texans passed 56% of the time, compared with 64.8% overall. Their average depth of target fell from 9.6 yards overall to 6.7 when tied.
That is measurable support for the concern that the offense becomes more conservative in those situations. The results make the question more urgent: Houston generated −0.21 EPA per play when tied, compared with +0.09 both while leading and while trailing.
The rushing split is especially difficult to overlook. Those 40 runs produced −0.52 EPA per attempt, a 20% success rate and 2.4 yards per carry. The 51 passing plays generated +0.03 EPA per dropback with 49% success. The offense leaned more heavily on the less effective part of its attack, and the running results became substantially worse.
There is additional context. Pressure reached 43.5% in the tied-score sample, above Houston’s overall 31.6%. Opponents, down and distance, field position and individual high-leverage failures can influence the comparison. Fifty of the 91 tied-score plays also occurred in the first quarter, so tied-score struggles and slow starts overlap heavily.
The first-quarter sample shows a similar imbalance: +0.08 EPA per dropback against −0.34 per rush. Houston passed on 59.6% of those 94 plays. That raises a reasonable coaching question for the second half of the season: can the Texans give their passing strengths more influence over how games begin?
This doesn't necessarily mean Houston needs to abandon the run early in games, but it does raise questions about whether Caley is putting enough emphasis on the concepts and formations that have generated the most consistent results, including quick-game opportunities and Empty looks.
The answer needs to account for the defense in front of them. But repeatedly leaning on runs that have been unsuccessful is an expensive way to search for an offensive identity.
What is actually wrong with 12 personnel?
Houston’s two-tight-end grouping has produced −0.11 EPA per play and 36.8% success across 87 snaps. Three-tight-end personnel has generated +0.11 EPA and 53.5% success on 43 snaps. Those headline numbers make 13 personnel look much more attractive, but the underlying splits provide a better explanation.
From 12 personnel, Houston has run 55 times and passed 32 times. The runs produced −0.19 EPA per attempt and 29.1% success. The passing plays generated +0.03 EPA per dropback and 50% success. The package has supplied viable passing opportunities alongside a much less dependable rushing attack.
Formation matters within that personnel group. The 38 singleback snaps produced −0.31 EPA per play and 24% success. The 24 shotgun snaps generated +0.18 EPA and 58% success. That is a more specific issue for the staff to examine than simply deciding whether two tight ends belong on the field.
Nor can the difference between 12 and 13 be explained simply by one package drawing base defenses. Houston faced base personnel on 89% of its snaps in 12 and 91% in 13. The defensive-personnel label is similar, although the actual fronts, box counts and assignments still require closer study.
The situations differ, too. Forty percent of the 13-personnel snaps came with one to three yards to gain, compared with 17% in 12. Its 24 runs achieved 50% success despite averaging only three yards and −0.10 EPA. Its 19 passing plays produced +0.37 EPA per dropback. This has been useful situational offense, with passing contributing substantially to its value.
Jumbo is a separate formation label that overlaps those personnel packages. The sample includes 10 Jumbo snaps within 12 personnel and four within 13. Adding the personnel and formation totals together would count some plays twice.
There is a related question about tendency and personnel tradeoffs. In the DeMeco Ryans clip I posted today, he acknowledged that Houston had become run-heavy in jumbo and was examining how to change that balance. He also noted the cost of taking passing threats off the field. That is useful context, although his broader description of jumbo should not be treated as the exact same category as 12 personnel.
Singleback needs better answers on the ground
Houston's struggles from singleback formations are particularly interesting. For those unfamiliar, singleback typically features the quarterback under center with one running back lined up behind him and no fullback. It can be used with various personnel groupings, including multiple tight ends.
Across all personnel groups, Houston has run 75 times and passed 43 times from singleback. The runs generated −0.25 EPA per attempt and succeeded only 26.7% of the time. The passing plays generated +0.27 EPA per dropback with 44.2% success.
That distinction matters because an overall −0.06 EPA and 33.1% success rate can make the formation look uniformly broken. Its passing game has created value, including a downfield component: a 12.7-yard average target depth and 3.33-second average time to throw.
The adjustment should start with identifying which runs are failing, against which fronts, and whether Houston can create better complements from the same looks. The passing results give defenses something to respect. The staff needs the rushing menu to justify its share of the calls.
There is also a useful contradiction: singleback produced +0.11 EPA per play in the first quarter, while shotgun produced −0.31. A formation can struggle overall and still perform better in a particular situation. The slow-start problem cannot fairly be reduced to "too much singleback."
Empty deserves a bigger role
One formation I'd like to see Nick Caley utilize more frequently is Empty, with no running back aligned in the backfield and five eligible receivers distributed across the formation. I've been advocating for more of these looks, particularly given Houston's struggling offensive line and the benefits of spreading defenses out.
Across 23 charted Empty plays this season, Houston has generated +0.24 EPA per play with a 56.5% success rate. That's considerably better than the league averages of +0.06 EPA and 47% success from Empty formations.
The passing numbers are encouraging, too. On 22 dropbacks, Stroud has generated +0.24 EPA per play, completed 85% of his passes, and averaged just 2.53 seconds to throw. He's also produced a +14.3 completion percentage over expected (CPOE).
The sample is small, but the results are difficult to ignore.
I made this argument before and after the Giants game, when Houston used Empty just three times, all in the first half. Stroud completed all three passes for 29 yards, yet the Texans never returned to the formation after halftime.
And the reasoning goes beyond the production. Empty can help Stroud identify defensive intentions before the snap, spread out potential rushers, and create quicker answers without relying on a running back to sort through blitz pickups. It doesn't guarantee better protection, but protecting the quarterback isn't always about keeping more blockers in.
There are tradeoffs, of course. Empty removes the traditional running back pass protector and can leave the offense vulnerable if the defense brings more rushers than the protection can account for. That's why having appropriate hot routes and protection answers is critical.
Still, given Houston's difficulties sustaining drives and establishing the run, it's reasonable to question whether Empty deserves a larger role moving forward. The Texans have shown they can operate efficiently from these looks. The next step is determining whether that success can hold up with greater usage.
Stroud has strengths the offense can trust
Houston’s intermediate passing game supplies a foundation for greater consistency. On 63 charted throws 10–19 yards downfield, the Texans produced +0.50 EPA per play and 59% success. The league comparison is +0.40 and 55%.
The route outcomes reinforce that picture. Hitches generated +0.40 EPA and 69% success on 42 charted plays. In routes produced +0.55 and 64% on 22. Those are promising ways to create productive completions without requiring every gain to come from a deep shot.
The coverage results are encouraging as well. Houston generated +0.60 EPA against Cover 2, +0.27 against Cover 4 and +0.71 against Cover 6. All three exceed the corresponding league EPA averages. Cover 4’s 47% success rate is approximately level with the league’s 48%, so its positive average EPA should not be confused with unusually high consistency.
Nico Collins’ availability changes the man-coverage discussion. He missed Weeks 2 and 3. Against Cover 1 in those games, Houston produced −0.08 EPA on 17 classified plays. In Weeks 1 and 4–7, that rose to +0.69 on 22 plays, with success improving from 41% to 59%.
Those game splits include different opponents and circumstances, so they cannot isolate Nico’s individual effect. They do show why the full-season total needs context. Cover 0 remains a more unsettled answer: Houston produced −0.08 EPA across 16 classified plays, and only three occurred during his absence.
The blitz results provide another reason to trust the passing game. On 73 plays labeled as blitzes, Houston generated +0.37 EPA per dropback with 57.5% success, compared with +0.06 and 45.5% without a charted blitz. Pressure was more frequent against blitzes, but the overall outcomes were better.
That makes a broad claim that Houston cannot handle aggressive defenses difficult to sustain. The particular coverage, protection and receiving answers matter. The offense has demonstrated that it can punish additional rushers.
Protection still deserves its own review. My October 31 Giants cut-up collects 26 of Houston’s 35 dropbacks, removing most quick throws and screens where the line was not asked to sustain blocks. It provides a more focused set of plays to examine alongside the season-long passing splits; it is not a random sample of the offense.
The screen question needs more precision
Houston’s 15 charted screens produced −0.30 EPA per target and 26.7% success, below the league’s −0.08 and 41%. Every one was completed, but together they gained only 48 yards. Completion alone is doing little to explain their value.
Seven targets went to wide receivers, six to running backs and two to tight ends. Nico’s four screens gained 23 yards, generated +0.14 EPA per target and succeeded half the time. The other three receiver screens gained six yards combined, with none producing positive EPA.
I have been calling for Houston to spread defenses out and use more straightforward outside receiver screens. The idea is to make the perimeter game a more dependable complement to the rushing attack.
That leaves room for a more deliberate perimeter package, particularly if Houston can exploit cushion and favorable blocking numbers. It also argues for specificity. Throwing more of an unsuccessful design will not automatically provide an extension of the running game. The screen label alone does not identify alignment, blocking structure or whether the throw was a check at the line.
The useful film question is which looks can create a clean path for the receiver, and whether Houston can access them more reliably. Nico’s small sample offers something worth examining, without establishing that volume alone is the solution.
Keep the useful aggression
Second-and-short is one place where the numbers complicate my earlier criticism. In that October 31 post, I questioned how often Houston was hunting bigger plays instead of securing first downs. On second-and-1 or second-and-2, however, Houston passed 13 times and ran eight times. The passes generated +0.47 EPA per dropback, compared with −0.03 per rush, and carried an 11.8-yard average target depth.
There may be individual decisions worth challenging, especially when the game calls for securing possession. But this 21-play sample gives no basis for blaming the offense’s broader inconsistency on taking chances in those situations. Understanding what happened on the following downs would sharpen that evaluation further.
Houston's bye-week review should focus on preserving the passing aggression that has generated value while addressing the rushing concepts and situations that have repeatedly failed. That starts with reevaluating the approach when games are tied, the effectiveness of running from 12 personnel and singleback formations, and finding more dependable ways to manufacture easier yards.
I'd also like to see a greater emphasis on Empty formations. The sample remains limited, but Houston has generated encouraging results from these looks, and they offer another way to help Stroud operate without relying on an ineffective rushing attack. More Empty, a better-designed perimeter screen game, and continued emphasis on the intermediate passing concepts already producing results could help make this offense more consistent without sacrificing its explosive potential.
The encouraging part is that Houston doesn't need to reinvent its passing attack. Stroud has demonstrated an ability to punish several coverage families, attack intermediate windows, and produce against the blitz. The foundation is there.
The challenge for Nick Caley coming out of the bye isn't necessarily making this offense more aggressive or more conservative. It's figuring out how to make the productive plays more consistent, while letting what this offense does best dictate its identity rather than forcing an identity it has struggled to execute.
Data note: This analysis covers Houston’s first seven games of the 2026 regular season, with league comparisons through eight weeks and all game situations included. Success means positive EPA. Coverage, route and target-depth splits reflect available charted plays; blitz designations use FTN charting. Small samples and differences in opponents and situations should be considered when interpreting the results.
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