Texans Defense After the Bye: What’s Changed Under DeMeco Ryans?
After going back through the film, I am more encouraged by Houston’s defense than I was immediately after the Giants loss. There are stretches where the effort, communication and execution look closer to what this group should be. There are also enough recurring problems that calling the defense fixed would get ahead of what it has actually done.
The numbers reinforce that distinction. Through seven games, Houston allowed 0.05 EPA per play compared with a league average of 0.01 over the same seven weeks.
Opponents generated positive EPA on 42.0% of Houston’s plays, compared with 43.7% leaguewide. The Texans have been somewhat better at preventing successful plays by that definition while still allowing more expected value overall. That is a useful description of the problem: enough good snaps to see the potential, enough costly failures to undermine it.
Success rate here means the percentage of plays generating positive EPA for the offense. It does not use the alternative definition based on gaining a specified percentage of the yards needed on each down. All EPA figures below are offensive EPA allowed, so lower numbers favor the defense.
The clearest difference from the league is explosive plays. Houston allowed an explosive on 14.9% of plays, compared with 12.9% leaguewide, using thresholds of at least 15 yards on a pass or 10 yards on a run. That two-percentage-point gap is more informative than treating Houston’s 5.4 yards per play as dramatically different from the league: both round to the same figure.
What has changed under DeMeco Ryans?
Ryans reclaimed defensive play-calling after the 0–4 start. Comparing Weeks 1–4 with Weeks 5–7 offers some evidence of progress, particularly against the pass, but it does not produce a clean turnaround story.
Passing EPA allowed fell from 0.18 per dropback to essentially zero. The pressure rate increased from 28.4% to 36.5%, while the charted blitz rate rose from 20.5% to 31.7%.
Those are different measures: pressure describes disruption, while blitz rate describes how often Houston sent additional rushers. The later window also featured more man coverage, increasing from 17.7% to 29.8% of classified coverage plays.
Those changes fit a more aggressive approach, but aggression is only useful if the defense finishes the play and protects the space behind it. Opponents’ passing success rate was essentially unchanged at 41.6% and 41.7%. Houston reduced the overall value surrendered through the air without making positive-EPA pass plays less frequent.
The rushing comparison goes the other way. Opponent rushing EPA increased from minus-0.13 to plus-0.06 per carry, rushing success rose from 38.1% to 48.1%, and yards per carry increased from 3.3 to 4.5. Overall EPA allowed improved modestly, from 0.07 to 0.02 per play, while the opponent success rate worsened from 40.3% to 44.2%. There is progress to build on, but it has not extended evenly across the defense.
Tennessee showed the ceiling; the next two games showed the work remaining
The individual games matter more than a three-game average. Houston allowed minus-0.36 EPA per play against Tennessee, with 3.2 yards per play and a 38.1% opponent success rate. The pressure rate was 44.4% despite a 15.2% blitz rate. That performance showed Houston could create disruption without needing to manufacture it with extra rushers on every series.
Jacksonville and New York were different. Houston allowed 0.16 EPA per play and a 52.2% success rate against the Jaguars, then 0.25 EPA per play and a 41.5% success rate against the Giants. Jacksonville was more consistently productive; New York extracted more value from a smaller share of successful plays. Calling both games the same kind of defensive failure misses that distinction.
The Titans game therefore deserves credit without becoming evidence that every subsequent issue was an exception. It accounts for much of the improvement in the combined Weeks 5–7 EPA figure. Different opponents, changing personnel and a small sample prevent that split from isolating the effect of the play-caller.
Pitre’s absence changes more than one position
My concern when having lost Jalen Pitre was the chain reaction it creates. His role helps Houston play with defensive backs on the field without treating every lighter personnel grouping as a concession against the run. Moving Lassiter inside changes the outside corner configuration as well as the slot matchup. That is a structural issue, not simply a question of whether one replacement wins his assignment.
The personnel numbers make the shift visible. Houston used nickel on 84% of plays in Weeks 1–4 and 97% against Tennessee. Across Jacksonville and New York, nickel fell to 41% and base rose to 51%. Opponents also presented different problems: 22 personnel accounted for 22 plays in those last two games, compared with one against Tennessee.
Houston’s response and the offenses it faced changed together.
It would be too strong to say Pitre’s absence caused the statistical decline. Those two games produced 0.20 EPA allowed per play, but they are only two games against different opponents. The Giants game also came without Reed Blankenship, for whatever that may be worth. The fair conclusion is that Houston was defending under materially different conditions, and restoring its preferred personnel could improve its options. The size of that improvement is still something the defense has to demonstrate.
The run defense needs better answers, not a more flattering box score
The Giants finished with 188 rushing yards on 34 carries in the play dataset. Their three overtime offensive snaps produced 2.05 EPA per play. Overtime plainly magnified the final picture, but those plays count, and defending the deciding possession is part of the assignment. Houston allowed 21 points in regulation before New York’s winning touchdown made it 27–21.Across seven games Houston allowed 3.8 yards per carry, below the league’s 4.1, yet opponents earned positive EPA on 42.5% of rushes versus 39.9% leaguewide. On third or fourth down with two yards or fewer to go, Houston surrendered a first down on 19 of 24 plays (79%), compared with 64% leaguewide. That includes runs and passes. On the 19 rushes alone, offenses averaged 2.9 yards and gained +0.41 EPA per carry. The league figures were 2.7 yards and +0.05 EPA. Houston allowed positive EPA on 15 of those 19 rushes (79%), versus 67% leaguewide. The sample is small, but it captures the problem: two or three yards can be all an offense needs to keep a drive alive.
The more useful film question is why the damaging runs happened. My run-defense cutups of Sheldon Rankins, Tommy Togiai and Kayden McDonald point toward different evaluations within the same front, rather than a blanket judgment that the entire interior played poorly. My concern with Rankins on early downs is what happens when double teams move him off his spot and change the linebackers’ entry points. Against an offense using wham and trap concepts, attacking upfield can also create opportunities for blockers arriving from unexpected angles. Slanting the front can disrupt one answer while opening a different gap if the offense counters it.
Togiai deserves a significant place in that conversation. In my Giants cutup, I thought he generally anchored well against double teams, held his ground and maintained his gaps. Runs going away from him did not automatically make those snaps failures. His ability to occupy his space is part of what allows the rest of the defense to fit around him.
The winning Singletary run is an example of why the assignment matters. My reading is that Togiai is trying to avoid the wham block, even though the result can initially look like he has been washed out. The larger problem appears to begin with McDonald getting displaced, allowing the double team to climb and seal Henry To’oTo’o. That is my film interpretation, rather than a confirmed account of Houston’s assignments.
That play does not erase the encouraging parts of McDonald’s outing. I liked several reps where he stood up blockers and handled double teams, with work over the center, shaded to the center and inside the guards. Houston also used him in Bear fronts with five defenders across the line. There were reps where he lost his spot and room to improve his consistency, but enough good work to support an increasing role. The key is letting that development help the rotation without treating the rookie as a finished answer.
The box-count split gives Houston something to build on. Through seven games, 247 of 460 snaps were charted as light box and 213 as heavy box. Opponents averaged 3.8 yards per carry against both looks, but generated −0.16 EPA per rush on 50 light-box runs and roughly zero EPA per rush on 124 heavy-box runs. Offenses ran on about one in five light-box snaps and nearly three in five heavy-box snaps. Those are different situations and play choices, so I’d use the light-box reps as evidence that Houston can hold up there.
Separate coverage busts from contested losses
The Fidone leak stands out to me as a communication issue, but my original thread laid out more than one possible coverage explanation. If it is Cover 1, my concern is Henry To’oTo’o failing to recognize Fidone leaking out while Stewart and Al-Shaair appear to handle Likely with in-and-out responsibilities. If it is Cover 3, my alternative reading points toward Lassiter’s responsibility, with Stewart caught between two threats. The call and exact assignments are not established, and identifying the nearest defender is not enough to assign blame.
A receiver beating coverage and a receiver being left uncovered require different corrections. The same distinction matters when evaluating Nabers against Lassiter inside: the matchup result should not automatically be described as another bust.Houston allowed +0.54 EPA per classified Cover 1 pass play across 45 snaps, compared with +0.02 across 100 Cover 3 snaps. The league figures were +0.20 and +0.14, respectively. Cover 1 and Cover 3 typically leave one safety deep, which can free another defender to fit the run. Cover 1 also leaves corners more exposed one-on-one, while Cover 3 gives them zone help and presents different throwing windows. That’s how a defense can make life difficult for the run and still give up damaging passes. A single-high shell and a loaded box measure different things. The front, offensive formation and safety rotation all affect how many defenders are actually in the box. I’d read the Cover 1 numbers as a reason to look closely at the matchups and explosive plays in those calls.
There is a similar warning in the target-depth numbers. Houston allowed 0.94 EPA per deep target across 25 plays, compared with 0.42 leaguewide. Those are small samples, but they reinforce the need to study the costly completions instead of treating the overall completion rate as a complete account of coverage quality.
What would make the optimism convincing?
Ryans has already changed how Houston calls games. Next Gen Stats had the blitz rate at 20.8% in Weeks 1–4, 24.4% in his first game against Tennessee and 39.2% across Jacksonville and New York. Man coverage rose from 17.0% in Weeks 1–4 to 35.1% in those last two games. I buy the change in approach. The results are harder to separate from the personnel and schedule. Tennessee was a struggling offense, but Houston had Pitre and played its best defensive game of the season. Pitre missed the next two, and the big nickel package went from 85.9% of snaps through Week 5 to 5.3% without him. That makes me wonder how much of the man and pressure spike was a response to losing Pitre. With less access to his big nickel package, Ryans may have leaned on tighter matchups and extra rushers to disrupt timing. He also had different offenses to prepare for, so there’s room for both personnel and game plan in that explanation. Both defenses had a rough afternoon on the slick London surface. The trip back before the Giants game is another possible factor, though I can’t tell from film whether travel affected the performance. NFL Pro matchup insights
I also think the Giants’ offense may be better than we gave it credit for. J.J. McCarthy threw five completions of 20-plus yards against Houston in his first Giants start, a week after throwing for 243 yards in relief against New Orleans. How much of that carries forward is an open question. Houston had flashed earlier against Cincinnati, too. Will Anderson Jr. generated five pressures, four of them quick, in that game under Burke. Giants game review · Saints game review · Cincinnati pressure data
The edge rush is a big reason I still buy a rebound. Next Gen Stats credited Anderson with a league-leading 41 pressures and 19 quick pressures entering Week 9. Danielle Hunter’s pressure rate is almost unchanged from last year (13.9% vs. 14.3%), even as his chip-or-double rate climbed five percentage points to 35.6%, the highest among qualified edge rushers. He’s turning fewer pressures into sacks, which matters, but opponents are still spending protection resources on him. Quick throws and moving the launch point can also reduce an edge rusher’s window. The aggregate release times I checked, 2.82 seconds against Houston and 2.83 leaguewide, give me little reason to call quicker throws a season-wide trend, and I haven’t quantified how often teams are moving the pocket. Next Gen Stats pass-rush and protection data
My hunch is that some of the possible coverage busts we saw early could have compounded over time. If Matt Burke had more day-to-day control of the operation through the offseason, the habits players built in meetings and on the practice field would still be there when Ryans took over the calls. That’s my theory about how a handoff might play out. I don’t know how the staff divided that work, or which apparent busts came down to a call, a check or a player’s execution. The bye gave Ryans extra practice time to work through those details. On Wednesday he took the defense back to what Anderson called pee wee tackling drills, working on driving through the ball carrier, wrapping up and finishing. My post on the tackling drills
I think this can be an upper-tier defense again with Ryans more directly involved. A big part of that is whether Kayden McDonald, Tommy Togiai and new addition Naquan Jones can hold up inside in a 4-2-5. If they can occupy doubles and keep the two linebackers clean, Pitre can fit the run from the slot while Houston keeps two safeties deep more often. That would give Ryans more freedom to protect against explosives and pick his spots to bring a safety down or send pressure. I still want to see this group get off the field when the offense only needs a yard or two. If Houston can do that and make offenses work for their deep completions, I can see the defense getting back to where we expected it to be.
Statistical scope: 2026 regular season through Week 7, with no garbage-time exclusion. Success rate measures plays with positive offensive EPA. Blitz rates use FTN charting. Official Giants game details · Giants-game inactives · Naquan Jones transaction.
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