The Texans Offense Has Been Awful — Here’s Why, and What Comes Next
- 4 days ago
- 18 min read
Disclaimer on Data & Grades
All statistics in this article reflect league-wide numbers through the end of Week 3 of the 2025 season and do not include any games thereafter.
PFF grades are referenced at times, but it’s important to note they are subjective evaluations. I use them when they align with what shows up on film, not as standalone truth. Charting data (like pressures, time-to-throw, and pass protection breakdowns) is more objective, but even here there are minor differences between sources — for example, PFF and Next Gen Stats may chart pressures slightly differently. Where possible, I’ve cross-checked both to present the clearest picture.
From Hope to Frustration
When the Texans fired Bobby Slowik, I thought they needed to swing for an experienced offensive coordinator with a true spread background — someone like Chip Kelly, Doug Pederson, or Mike McCarthy. McCarthy had announced he was taking the year off after being fired, Pederson was also recently fired and appeared set to take the year off, and Kelly ended up signing a record-breaking $6M/year deal with the Raiders.
Many have already criticized Kelly’s slow start in Las Vegas, but that misses the point: his personnel there is far different from what he would have inherited in Houston. With the Texans, it could have been a seamless transition. Kelly coached alongside Ryan Day — Stroud’s college head coach at Ohio State — and the terminology, concepts, and lingo would have translated quickly. In effect, you’d be dropping Stroud back into an offensive environment that maximized his strengths in college, rather than forcing him to adapt to something new. That’s why I thought Kelly was the ideal fit.
Instead, Houston went with Nick Caley, a first-time playcaller from the McVay tree. I had my reservations. Caley came from Sean McVay’s staff, and I worried that meant more of the same Shanahan-tree offense I didn’t like under Slowik — condensed formations, heavy wide-zone reliance, and limited QB control. But as I learned more, I bought in. Caley’s background in New England under Josh McDaniels suggested a flexible, gameplan-driven approach. Reports that he helped the Rams shift from wide zone to more gap concepts gave me hope that the Texans would lean into a style better suited to their personnel.
On top of that, C.J. Stroud was finally being given more control — identifying the Mike, setting protections, diagnosing pressure — things Slowik’s system had restricted. With Stroud’s talent, a retooled offensive line, and what I thought was a better schematic fit, I genuinely believed this offense could be top 10 in 2025.
But it wasn’t just about the coordinator hire. The Texans kept the entire offensive staff intact, only replacing Slowik with Caley and OL coach Chris Strausser with his assistant, Cole Popovich. Popovich has New England experience and strong reviews, but limited time as a lead coach. Continuity has value — maybe they thought the core staff could identify and fix what went wrong in 2024 — but if the system itself was the problem, this was more of a “soft reset” than a hard one. That may help explain why some of the same issues persist, particularly with RBs and TEs in pass protection and WRs making detail mistakes on routes.
It also raises fair questions: Was the Caley hire purely DeMeco Ryans’ call, or did Nick Caserio’s New England and John Carroll ties with Caley play a role? Did Caley get to keep the assistants he wanted, or did DeMeco push for continuity with guys he liked? These are the kinds of decisions that ripple forward — and they’re worth monitoring as the season unfolds.
Reality Through 3 Games
All of that offseason optimism has quickly run into reality. The Texans are 0-3, dead last in points per game (12.7), 29th in yards (267), 26th in passing (172), and 23rd in rushing (95). Yes, it’s still a small sample size, but the problems are visible enough — and familiar enough — that they demand closer examination.
A big problem: they’re not sustaining drives. Houston has only reached the red zone four times and has scored zero touchdowns there. The offense has just three total TDs all season: a Stroud go ball to Nico Collins vs Tampa, a run Tampa let Nick Chubb score late, and another Collins route vs Jacksonville on a double move.
Third Downs: The Symptom of a Bigger Problem
Through three games, the Texans are 8-for-33 (24.2%) on 3rd down, dead last in the league. That number isn’t just bad — it’s a direct reflection of issues we see on early downs, play design, and execution.
Week 1 vs Rams: Houston lived in 3rd & long. Penalties and negative plays killed drives before they even had a chance. They went 2-for-9 overall, with most attempts coming in situations of 3rd & 7 or more. It’s no surprise the offense couldn’t sustain momentum when every series was behind the sticks.
Week 2 vs Buccaneers: The profile was different — Houston finally got some short-yardage chances, but failed to capitalize. They went just 1-for-3 on 3rd & 1–2 yards, including a sack and a failed red-zone throw. They finished 2-for-9 again, not because they were buried in long distances, but because they squandered manageable ones.
Week 3 vs Jaguars: The most balanced week in terms of distance — the Texans had short, mid, and long opportunities. But instead of using those spots to extend drives and build rhythm, they imploded. A fumble, an interception, and missed throws on mid-range downs dropped them to 4-for-15. Even when they reached short yardage, play design and decision-making undercut them.
The Trend: If there’s a silver lining, it’s that Houston is at least creating more short and mid-yardage opportunities as the weeks go on. That’s progress from Week 1’s penalty-fueled disaster. The problem is what they do when they get there. Nick Caley has been too aggressive with his play-calling, leaning on shot plays in 3rd & 3 or 3rd & 4 situations — deep play-action or longer-developing routes that expose the offensive line and invite sacks or turnovers.
This isn’t just a play-calling issue; it’s a philosophy problem that needs to be communicated to C.J. Stroud. Third downs are about discipline — calling and executing designs that give Stroud short, high-percentage options, and trusting him to take the checkdown when it’s there rather than forcing throws downfield. It’s about a mindset shift: stop chasing explosives and start valuing the drive-sustaining 5-yard gain.
That also applies when Stroud tucks the ball and runs. He’s been more willing to scramble this year, but there’s still meat left on the bone. When lanes open, he has to be decisive, turn on his speed, and not take any yard for granted. In an offense struggling to score, every yard matters — especially on early downs to make 3rd more manageable.
The Texans haven’t earned the right to play hero-ball yet. Until they stack first downs, stay ahead of the chains, and build rhythm through discipline and tempo, defenses will keep baiting them into low-percentage plays that stall drives.
Red Zone Bleeds from Third Down
The Texans’ red-zone issues can’t be separated from their 3rd-down struggles. Through three games, Houston has reached the red zone just four times and is 0-for-4 on touchdowns. That’s not simply bad red-zone execution — it’s a symptom of drives stalling before they can even build rhythm.
When you fail on 3rd down, you don’t get the extra plays that set up red-zone looks. Houston is averaging just 12.7 points per game, last in the league, largely because they can’t sustain possessions long enough to create consistent scoring opportunities.
And when they have cracked the 20, playcalling has let them down:
Against Tampa, the Texans had 2nd & goal at the 1 and came away with nothing. After a failed run, Caley dialed up back-to-back shotgun passes on 3rd and 4th down, a double move on the 1 yard line & a sprint left with a right handed QB. Both fell incomplete, leaving points on the field in a game they eventually lost by one score.
That sequence summed up the problem: instead of playing to your strength (physicality, quick hitters, QB sneaks, or misdirection), Houston tried to get cute — and it backfired.
The offense also lacks a clear identity down there. Their only three offensive TDs all season have come from:
A Nico Collins touchdown vs Tampa (outside the red zone).
A Chubb run that Tampa let him score late in that same game (outside the red zone).
Another Collins double move vs Jacksonville (outside the red zone).
None of these were the result of a sustained, multi-play red-zone drive. Everything has either been situational or reliant on a single receiver winning his route.
Just like on 3rd down, the Texans haven’t earned the right to hunt for big plays in the red zone. Until they show they can consistently move the chains, stack first downs, and execute short-yardage with discipline, red-zone efficiency won’t improve.
Bottom line: The Texans aren’t just bad in the red zone — they’re rarely there, and when they are, their approach makes it even harder to finish drives.
Run Game: Better Than the Perception
At first glance, Houston’s rushing attack looks like another weakness. But the truth is it's not as bad as it seems:
4.4 yards per carry (16th in NFL) — right at league average.
21.7 attempts per game (30th) — second-fewest in the league.
The problem isn’t efficiency; it’s volume and sequencing.
Houston has leaned on inside zone and duo, a better fit for this offensive line than Bobby Slowik’s wide-zone system. C.J. Stroud has also chipped in with effective scrambles — 6.4, 6.8, and 5.5 YPC through three games. The ground game is doing its job when called on.
The issue is how little it’s being used, and when. Because the Texans fail on 3rd down so often — and especially because they spend so much time in 3rd & long — they don’t generate the sustained drives that allow the run game to pile up carries. A ground game built around inside runs and power needs rhythm to wear down a defense. Instead, the Texans are constantly off the field before it can make an impact.
Personnel matters here too. Houston has already weeded out Dameon Pierce and Dare Ogunbowale from taking meaningful snaps, but the next step is giving Woody Marks more opportunity. Nick Chubb remains effective with his vision and power, but at this stage of his career he doesn’t have the explosiveness to bounce outside or hit a screen pass for a chunk play. Chubb’s value comes from grinding defenses down over four quarters — but that only works if the Texans sustain drives and give him the volume.
Marks offers a change of pace: more juice in space, more potential for explosive gains, and a skill set that complements Chubb. If Caley leans into that balance — Chubb as the steady hammer, Marks as the spark — Houston’s run game can be more than just “average on paper.” It can be a tool to take pressure off Stroud, keep the offense on schedule, and help set up the tempo game they need to establish rhythm.
Bottom line: The run game isn’t broken. It’s being wasted. Until the Texans convert more 3rd downs and commit to volume, the rushing attack won’t have the chance to tilt games the way it’s capable of.
Injuries and Personnel Impact (Not an Excuse, But Context)
The Texans’ offensive struggles can’t be explained away by injuries, but they’ve clearly shaped the early-season picture.
Tight ends: Cade Stover, Brevin Jordan, and Irv Smith Jr. have all been unavailable. Maybe not elite names, but their absence matters — Stover brought more blocking upside, and Jordan and Smith would’ve added versatility. Instead, Houston has leaned on Dalton Schultz and Harrison Bryant. Schultz has been inconsistent, and Bryant — new to the team and still adapting to the scheme — hasn’t settled into a steady role yet. That’s left the offense thinner both in pass protection and in its route mix.
Backfield: Joe Mixon was supposed to be the centerpiece back, but missing him early has shifted the workload to Nick Chubb and Woody Marks. Chubb still flashes vision and power, but he lacks the burst to hit big plays outside or on screens. He’s best when fed carries to wear down defenses — but that requires sustaining drives. Marks, meanwhile, brings explosiveness Houston badly needs, but he hasn’t been featured consistently yet.
Receivers: Tank Dell’s season-ending injury has loomed large. Houston’s WR room is heavy on “X” types — Collins, Hutchinson, Watson (now on IR), Higgins — and Dell’s ability to stretch defenses horizontally and vertically is irreplaceable. Christian Kirk and Braxton Berrios, both slot options, were banged up the first two weeks, leaving Houston without a true slot presence. That may explain why the tempo offense looked sharper in Week 3 — having actual slot receivers healthy again. Rookie Noel has that skillset too, but has barely been used.
The bigger point: Injuries have stripped Houston of some of its diversity. They aren’t an excuse for being dead last in offense, but they help explain the redundancy at WR, the shakiness in pass protection, and the lack of separation we’ve seen in the passing game. When every receiver has a similar skill set, it compresses the field and makes life harder for Stroud. The next step has to be playing rookies like Higgins, Noel, and Marks more — not just to fill in, but to expand what this offense can do.
Pass Protection: Not As Bad, But Flawed in Key Ways
Fans feel like protection is collapsing, but the numbers don’t paint it as bottom-tier. In fact, the Texans rank 15th in pressure rate allowed (36.4%) per Next Gen, trending in the right direction: down from 41.2% in Week 1 to 32.6% in Week 3. They’re also tied for 22nd in sacks allowed (2.7/game) — not great, but far from the league’s worst.
The real problem isn’t always the offensive line. Backs and tight ends have been major liabilities in pass protection.
PFF grades vs Jacksonville: Woody Marks (2.4), Nick Chubb (19.6), Harrison Bryant (28.7).
Pressures allowed (per PFF, Week 3): 16 total — 4 on TEs/RBs, 5 on rookie LT Aireontae Ersery, 3 on Tytus Howard, 2 on Jake Andrews, 1 each on Ed Ingram and Laken Tomlinson.
Ersery is a rookie who’s flashed, but it’s unfair to leave him on an island in high-leverage spots — like the game-sealing INT vs Jacksonville, when Josh Hines-Allen beat him clean, tipped Stroud’s pass, and forced the turnover. That’s not just an OL failure; that’s a situational awareness failure. In that moment, help should’ve come from the guard or a chip from the RB/TE.
Blitz Recognition: The Lingering Weak Spot
One trend that stands out is how often Houston is getting pressured by blitzes, especially from the edge. The charting backs it up: edge and slot blitzes make up a disproportionate share of the Texans’ pressures allowed.
C.J. Stroud’s splits reflect the issue. When kept clean, he’s sharp — 68.3% completions, 7.2 YPA, 2 TDs, 1 INT. But when blitzed, his grade plummets: just 34.1 per PFF, with one interception and no touchdowns. Compare that to non-blitzed situations, where he’s far more efficient (80.6 grade, 6.6 YPA). This tells us two things:
The Blitz Is Winning Right Now. Houston isn’t struggling across the board in protection — they’re 15th in pressure rate allowed overall — but blitzes are hitting home at too high a rate.
Stroud’s Command Is Still Growing. He has more responsibility this year to identify the Mike, set protections, and adjust backs/TEs. That’s a natural learning curve for a third-year QB in a new system. Some of these hits may trace back to him not sliding protection or recognizing the free rusher quickly enough.
Still, this isn’t just on Stroud. Houston’s backs and TEs remain the weak links. Even when Stroud sets protections correctly, execution has to hold. A late pickup from a RB or TE still blows up the play.
How To Counter It
This is where play-calling and philosophy come in:
Screens and quick throws should be automatic when teams are blitzing heavy from the slot/edge.
Hot routes — giving Stroud simple, built-in answers when a free rusher comes — need to be emphasized more.
Tempo also helps: getting to the line faster allows Stroud more time to diagnose blitz looks and forces defenses to declare earlier.
Spread: better spacing, get defenders out of the box that enter on condensed formations
The Texans don’t need to eliminate blitz pressure entirely (no team does). They just need to minimize it to where it isn’t derailing drives. If they can make defenses pay with well-timed quick game and screens, blitzing becomes a risk for opponents — not a reward.
Stroud’s Role: Narrative vs. Reality
For two years now, the common critique has been that C.J. Stroud holds the ball too long and creates sacks. The data flatly rejects that.
2025: Stroud has had 36 pressured dropbacks (t-10th most), but he’s responsible for just 5.6% of them — ranking 31st out of 36 QBs with at least 10 pressured dropbacks. Only Baker Mayfield (2.6%), Joe Flacco (0%), and Michael Penix (0%) are lower with a similar or higher workload.
At the other end: Lamar Jackson (34.3%), Justin Herbert (25%), and Patrick Mahomes (23.1%) are among QBs most often responsible for their own pressures.
This means Stroud is doing his job — the pressure is coming from elsewhere.
Year-to-Year Comparison
This isn’t a one-off. I wrote about this exact issue in the offseason, breaking down how little Stroud was responsible for sacks in 2024, and the same trends are continuing under Nick Caley.
Here’s how it looks side by side (Texans % of pressures allowed vs. league average):
Position | 2024 Texans | 2024 League Avg | 2025 Texans (through 3 gms) | Trend |
QB | 12.1% | 15.0% | 5.6% (Stroud) | 📉 way down |
LT | 12.1% | 22.0% | 19.4% | holding steady |
LG | 22.5% | 18.0% | 19.4% | still high |
C | 12.1% | 13.0% | 11.1% | slightly better |
RG | 19.5% | 18.0% | 13.9% | improved |
RT | 22.1% | 21.0% | 25.0% | worse |
TE | 6.9% | 2.4% | 2.8% | still a weak spot |
RB | 5.6% | 6.5% | 19.4% (highest in NFL) | 🚨 major regression |
Key takeaway:
In 2024, the problem was tight ends, who allowed nearly triple the league average.
In 2025, the problem has flipped — running backs are responsible for 19.4% of pressures, the single highest rate of any backfield in the NFL.
This not only confirms that Stroud isn’t the one creating sacks, but also that Houston’s pass-protection struggles have shifted position groups year over year.
And remember — this is relative to the share of the team’s total pressures and where they’re being distributed. In other words, it’s less about raw volume and more about identifying which position groups are the biggest trouble spots within the Texans’ pass-protection structure.
These stats (min. 30 dropbacks, 34 QBs) reinforce that Stroud is not holding onto the ball too long:
Time in pocket: 2.85 seconds on 106 dropbacks — tied for 18th with Jared Goff.
Time to throw (all attempts): 2.58 seconds — tied for 17th with Michael Penix Jr. and Tua Tagovailoa.
Time to throw on sacks: 3.14 seconds — 9th-shortest in the NFL, meaning when he is sacked, it happens quickly rather than because he’s sitting in the pocket forever.
Time to throw on scrambles: 5.7 seconds — tied for 20th longest, showing he can extend when needed but isn’t over-reliant.
Dropbacks under 2 seconds: 46.2% — 15th in the league, right in the middle.
Taken together, this shows Stroud is operating on league-average timing overall, and when sacks do occur, they arrive faster than for most quarterbacks. Far from being careless with the ball, he’s executing within structure — it’s the protection around him that’s failing.
Why It Matters
Stroud: Among the most efficient QBs at avoiding self-inflicted sacks.
RBs/TEs: The biggest weak links, especially with Cade Stover, Brevin Jordan, and Irv Smith Jr. sidelined. Depth options like Harrison Bryant are new to the system and still adapting.
OL: Not elite, but not as bad as perceived. Rookie growing pains (Ersery), injuries, and poor help have magnified issues.
It’s also worth noting the OL shuffling: Ersery played RT in Week 1, then LT in Weeks 2 and 3, so “pressures by position” aren’t locked to a single player. Jake Andrews missed a game and a half with Jarrett Patterson filling in. Juice Scruggs rotated in at LG and may stabilize that spot. Ed Ingram missed Week 1 at RG with Tytus sliding over. That instability matters.
Until the Texans fix the RB/TE blocking assignments and give Stroud situational help, the perception of a broken OL will linger — even though the numbers show it’s a more nuanced problem.
Wide Receivers: Execution More Than Concept
A lot of fans have pointed at the route concepts as the problem, but most of what shows up on film is about execution, not design.
Landmarks & spacing: Too often, WRs are drifting off their landmarks after being pressed at the line. That pushes them 5–6 yards off where they’re supposed to be, crowding into another route’s window.
Washed releases: Slot WRs and TEs are getting “washed” by linebackers, knocked off their stems and into other routes. It happens sometimes, but the better players fight back to their landmark or “stack” to regain proper depth. Houston’s WRs haven’t shown that discipline consistently so far.
Zone awareness: Receivers aren’t reading zone coverage with enough spatial awareness. Instead of throttling down or sitting in soft spots, they’re running through open windows. That makes Stroud look inaccurate when really it’s the WR not seeing the defense the same way. There were signs of progress in week 3, a trend we hope to see continue.
Christian Kirk, in his first game back, had multiple uncharacteristic routes. On Stroud’s INT vs Jacksonville, he got pushed off his stem by a linebacker and flattened out, dragging the underneath defender into the play. If he stays high, that throw could’ve been a chunk gain or even a touchdown.
Bigger point: These issues compress the offense. When multiple WRs end up in the same window, it looks like “bad concepts,” but it’s really about technique, spacing, and awareness. Until Houston’s WRs sharpen those details, Stroud’s precision won’t matter because the windows simply won’t be there.
Nick Caley: Growing Pains as a First-Time Playcaller
Caley has shown flashes — leaning more into gap runs, dialing up play-action against Jacksonville, and giving Stroud more control at the line. But his situational awareness still lags:
Calling deep shots on short/mid 3rd downs instead of moving the chains.
Leaving rookie LT Aireontae Ersery on an island in critical spots.
Overusing RBs/TEs in protection despite their consistent breakdowns.
The adjustments Houston needs to make:
Prioritize sustaining drives on 3rd down. Short and mid situations should be quick-game concepts, not hero-ball shots. Build rhythm first, then earn the right to attack deep.
Lean into tempo and the quick game. Stroud has always thrived here — from his Ohio State days (see the CFP vs Georgia) to his most efficient stretches in the NFL. Even DeMeco has said they need to “lean in” more. The key is that tempo doesn’t have to mean snapping instantly. It’s about getting to the line quickly so Stroud can control the game — ID defenses, check into favorable plays, manipulate coverages, use hard counts, and force defenses onto their heels. That first first down is the spark; from there, rhythm builds and the offense opens up.
Pass to set up the run. Quick throws take pressure off the OL, limit disguise, and keep defenses honest. Houston doesn’t need to abandon the ground game, but sequencing matters — let the pass loosen up defenses before leaning into Nick Chubb’s physicality late in games.
C.J. Stroud: Not the Problem, But Still Room to Grow
As shown earlier with the pressure and time-to-throw metrics, Stroud has been far less responsible for the offense’s struggles than the narrative suggests. He isn’t holding onto the ball too long, and when sacks happen, they usually come quickly rather than because of indecision.
Where Stroud can improve:
Discipline on checkdowns. When Caley dials up quick-game, he has to take the easy completion and trust the design instead of hunting bigger throws.
Decisiveness as a runner. He’s running more this year (5.5–6.8 YPC in each game), but often hesitates before taking off. There are yards — and first downs — being left on the field.
Pocket movement and comfort. Stroud needs to be more consistent stepping up and hanging in rather than drifting or showing “happy feet.” Some of this ties back to last year’s protection issues — he took a lot of hits behind a leaky line, and that kind of trauma is hard to undo. As the protection continues to stabilize relative to 2024 and even from Week 1 this year, the hope is that he’ll rebuild that trust and look more comfortable.
Pre-snap recognition. Stroud admitted after Week 1 that he missed a couple of defensive IDs, and from his pressers it’s clear that protections and checks are still a growth area. That’s natural for a QB in a new system with added responsibilities — but improvement here will only help the line and passing game.
The bottom line: Stroud is not holding this offense back. But to take the next step, he’ll need to tighten up the “boring” parts of quarterbacking — checkdowns, pocket poise, and defensive IDs — while continuing to lean on tempo and quick-game where he’s at his best.
Offensive Line Adjustments Moving Forward
The line has shuffled personnel all three weeks because of injuries, which has hurt continuity. But there are encouraging signs:
Juice Scruggs rotating in for Laken Tomlinson was a positive, and the unit as a whole has shown week-to-week growth even if the point totals don’t show it.
Ed Ingram has been solid, clearly an upgrade over Shaq Mason from last year.
Tytus Howard is steady but still has room to be sharper.
Aireontae Ersery is taking his rookie lumps but has upside — he just needs more consistent help in critical moments.
Jake Andrews and Jarrett Patterson have both been serviceable when healthy.
Continuity will matter, as will smarter play design to protect weak spots. Given the context, it’s a bummer Houston didn’t steal at least one of those first three close games. Still, there’s evidence this offense is trending upward: they moved the ball against Jacksonville, leaned into tempo, and were undone more by late turnovers than by being hopelessly outclassed.
I get why fans bristle at Caley, DeMeco, and Stroud saying they’re “close.” It can sound like excuse-making or even delusion. But from what the tape shows, they likely believe it — and they need to believe it. It’s the mindset required to fix what’s broken. And if you compare this to teams like the Rams, who started 2-4 last year and 3-6 the year before only to finish 10-7 both seasons, the message doesn’t feel so far-fetched. The Titans game is a chance to grab that first win, build some confidence, and go into Baltimore with real momentum.
Conclusion: Where They Go From Here
Three weeks in, the Texans know what they are — and what they aren’t. They can run the ball efficiently, they can protect better than people think, and they have a quarterback built for tempo and quick-game rhythm. But until they sustain drives, execute in short yardage, and show better situational awareness in playcalling, they’ll remain stuck at the bottom of the league in scoring.
Nick Caley doesn’t need to rip up the scheme. He just needs to lean harder into what works: let Stroud dictate at the line, emphasize rhythm passing, and use tempo to create momentum. Stroud isn’t the problem — if anything, he’s been masking bigger flaws — and giving him the structure he thrives in can change the arc of this season. If Houston commits to that path, this offense can still find its footing before the year slips away.
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